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Bayesian Persuasive Driving
Cheng Peng and Masayoshi Tomizuka
Abstract— In the autonomous driving area, interaction be-
tween vehicles is still a piece of puzzle which has not been fully
resolved. The ability to intelligently and safely interact with
other vehicles can not only improve self driving quality but also
be beneficial to the global driving environment. In this paper, a
Bayesian persuasive driving algorithm based on optimization is
proposed, where the ego vehicle is the persuader (information
sender) and the surrounding vehicle is the persuadee (informa-
tion receiver). In the persuasion process, the ego vehicle aims at
changing the surrounding vehicle’s posterior belief of the world
state by providing certain information via signaling in order to
achieve a lower cost for both players. The information received
by the surrounding vehicle and its belief of the world state
are described by Gaussian distributions. Simulation results in
several common traffic scenarios are provided to demonstrate
the proposed algorithm’s capability of handling interaction
situations involving surrounding vehicles with different driving
characteristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although autonomous vehicles have been spotted more
and more frequently driving on the city roads, most of
them are still not interacting with other road users like
human drivers do. Instead, most autonomous vehicles are
implementing a reactive behavior, which means that the
trajectory predictions about surrounding vehicles are made
first and the ego vehicle’s driving actions are decided accord-
ingly by applying obstacle avoidance algorithm. However,
in this planning pattern, the interaction between vehicles is
ignored since the interacting vehicle’s future driving profile
is assumed to be independent of the ego vehicle’s behavior.
Therefore, more efforts are needed to fulfill a real interactive,
efficient and cooperative driving environment where robot
cars and human drivers coexist.
Several approaches have been proposed for interactive
driving in literatures, which can be categorized into two
groups in general. The first category is multi-agent algo-
rithm [1]-[2], where the assumption is made that all the
vehicles involved in a driving scenario can be controlled.
In a multi-agent system, all the vehicles optimize the same
functional and each vehicle knows exactly what the others
will be doing and what influence its behavior will cause.
The major drawback of the multi-agent algorithm is that in
the real world, not all the related vehicles can be controlled,
especially at the current stage where autonomous vehicles
only make a minority of all road users. Another disadvan-
tage is its heavy dependency on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
This work was supported by China Scholarship Council (CSC) Scholar-
ship.
C. Peng and M. Tomizuka are with the Department of Mechanical
Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA (e-mail:
chengpeng2014@berkeley.edu; tomizuka@berkeley.edu).
communication which may not be reliable enough in real
system.
The second category of algorithm is based on interactive
prediction of surrounding vehicle’s future behaviors. Several
promising prediction approaches have been proposed in
literatures including partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP), deep neural network, optimization-based
method and so on. For example, a POMDP based decision
making strategy was proposed in [3] for intersection scenario
where interacting vehicles were assumed to pick one route
from a predetermined route hypothesis set. However, this
approach was confined to a specific driving situation due
to the fixed route hypothesis setting. In [4], several deep
neural network based motion models were evaluated for
the highway entrance scenario, among which a model was
selected for fast computation and relatively good perfor-
mance. The drawback of this approach is that its performance
heavily depends on feature selection which is not general
for different driving scenarios. Optimization provides another
direction of generating interactive prediction for surrounding
vehicles. As an example, in [5], the human driver behavior is
predicted by optimizing a reward function with pre-defined
structure and parameters learned via inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL) algorithm. Through including the learned
human model reward function in robot vehicle trajecotry
planning, the interaction effects can be handled. Compared
to the POMDP and neural network based methods, this
optimization-based approach is more computational efficient.
However, the learned reward function can only describe a
particular type of driver, which is not a general solution to
the interactive driving problem.
Another optimization-based interactive planning approach
is to formulate the interactive driving problem as a Bayesian
persuasion game, which is first proposed for economic
application [6]. In the Bayesian persuasion game, there is
one sender with information who attempts to persuade the
receiver to change his/her action so that the welfare of both
players can be improved. The basic assumptions include 1)
the receiver’s behavior is dependent on his/her belief of the
world state and 2) both the players are rational Bayesian
under which the interaction can be described as a Bayesian
process. The persuasion process can be achieved by the
sender via selecting certain information to convey to the
receiver so that the receiver’s posterior belief distribution of
the world state can be properly manipulated.
In this paper, the world state for the interactive driving
environment is defined to be the ego vehicle’s conservative-
ness perceived by the surrounding vehicle, the ego vehicle
is defined as the information sender, whose information
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of driving intention can be reflected from his/her driving
behavior and the surrounding interacting vehicle is the cor-
responding information receiver. With regard to the signal,
several candidates are available including binary signal of
yield or not yield, discrete signal of driving route selection
and continuous signal of driving state. As a starting point, the
ego vehicle’s continuous driving state is selected as the signal
since it carries the most driving information. By determining
the optimal signal based on an optimization, the ego vehicle
is able to achieve maximization/minimization of utility/cost
expectation for both players. Meanwhile, the receiver will
extract more information about the world state from the
perceived signal and thus his/her posterior belief of the world
state can be updated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion II, the mathematical formulation of the general Bayesian
persuasion problem is introduced. In Section III, the con-
crete Bayesian persuasion problem for interactive driving
is formulated as an optimization with certain constraints
incorporated including vehicle dynamics, safety and physical
saturation limit. In addition, the integrals are calculated and
the optimization problem is reformulated into a tractable
form. In Section IV, the proposed algorithm’s effectiveness
is illustrated by simulations in several driving scenarios.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. GENERAL BAYESIAN PERSUASION
In this section, the formulation of a general Bayesian
persuasion game is introduced and the related preliminary
notations are given.
A general and intuitive definition of the persuasion prob-
lem is to exploit some information advantage to influence
the opponent’s action or intention. In fact, the persuasion
behavior is ubiquitous in everyday life with applications in a
great deal of areas including economy, psycology, decision
making theory and so on. Basically, in almost any interacting
process, there always exists a persuasion scheme which is
advantageous to some or all players.
Among various persuasion models, the Bayesian persua-
sion model [6] first proposed for economy application stands
out as the most popular and fundamental one. In a Bayesian
persuasion game, there are two players: the player sending
information is called sender and the other one receiving
information is called receiver. The sender aims to change the
receiver’s action so that there is a higher probability that a
situation more beneficial to both parties can be achieved. The
receiver’s task is to pick an action based on the information
extracted from the sender’s signal. The reward/cost function
of the game depends on both players’ actions meaning that
neither player can determine the game’s result by himself.
This characteristic leads to the fact that both players cannot
exactly know what the reward or cost will be until both of
their actions have been unveiled.
In order to formulate the persuasion game mathematically,
some notations are introduced first. The action of the receiver
is denoted as a ∈ A, where A is the receiver’s action space.
The world state is represented by ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is the
world state space. The realization space of the sender’s
information signal is denoted as S and the corresponding
signal realization is s. However, the information carried by
the signal may not be fully comprehended by the receiver.
In the receiver’s point of view, the signal should be de-
scribed by a probability distribution which is called signal
belief distribution denoted by pi(s). Hence, pi(s) represents
the distribution of the information signal perceived by the
receiver. Due to the similar reason, another world state belief
distribution µ(ω|s) is introduced to describe how the world
state ω is influenced by the signal in the receiver’s mind.
For the game’s objective function, maximizing a reward
function and minimizing a cost function are equivalent. Thus,
without loss of generality, we choose to define a cost function
c(ω,a,s), which is dependent on the world state, receiver’s
action and the sender’s signal. With the notations defined
above, the Bayesian persuasion problem can be formulated
as:
min
pi(s)
Epi(s)cˆ(µ(ω|s)), (1)
where
cˆ(µ(ω|s)) = min
a
Eµ(ω|s)c(ω,a,s)
represents the expected cost at a specific signal realization s
when the receiver holds the belief distribution µ(ω|s). The
solution to the optimization (1) is defined as the optimal
signal and the corresponding achieved minimum value is
called the value of the optimal signal. In the Bayesian per-
suasion process described by (1), according to the rationality
assumption, the receiver will decide his action by optimizing
the objective function expectation given his belief of the
world state influenced by the sender’s signal. Moreover, since
the sender is aware that the receiver’s rational, he can then
determine the optimal signal to send based on the receiver’s
strategy.
In summary, the optimization problem in (1) illustrates
the idea that the sender’s purpose is to minimize both
players’ cost by manipulating the receiver’s posterior belief
distribution µ(ω|s) via conveying information via signaling
perceived by the receiver as a probability distribution pi(s).
III. BAYESIAN PERSUASIVE DRIVING
In this section, the Bayesian persuasion framework is
applied to the interacting driving problem with Gaussian
distribution assumption. The concrete definition of variables
are given in the autonomous driving context first and a
mathematical approximation is then applied to the resulting
driving persuasion problem to make it tractable.
A. Bayesian persuasion in autonomous driving context
In order to formulate a Bayesian persuasion game in the
autonomous driving background, the players along with their
possible actions and signals need to be clearly defined first.
Intuitively, the surrounding interacting vehicle is selected
as the information receiver and his driving state
xst = [ xst yst θ st vst ]
T
is defined as his action at , where xst , y
s
t , θ st and vst denote the
surrounding vehicle’s x−y positions, yaw angle and speed in
the lane-based coordinate frame at time instant t respectively.
The information sender role is then naturally assigned to the
ego vehicle. With regard to the signaling content, there are
quite a few options including intention indicator for yielding
or not yielding, route selection preference and the driving
state itself. In this paper, the ego vehicle’s driving state
xet = [ xet yet θ et vet ]
T
is chosen as the signal realization st since it includes
more intention/driving behavior information and it is directly
perceivable for the surrounding vehicle. Similar with the
notation for the surrounding vehicle, xet , y
e
t , θ et and vet denote
the ego vehicle’s x−y positions, yaw angle and speed in the
lane-based coordinate frame at time instant t respectively.
The last definition involved in the Bayesian persuaison
is the world state variable ω . The characteristic of the
Bayesian persuasion game imposes two requirements on
the state ω , which are 1) it determines the cost for both
players along with the receiver’s action and the sender’s
signal, 2) it cannot be directly influenced by the receiver’s
action. In order to satisfy the two mentioned properties,
the state is defined as the ego vehicle’s conservativeness
perceived by the surrounding vehicle. Basically, the state ω
denotes the receiver (surrounding vehicle)’s impression of
the sender (ego vehicle), whether aggressive, conservative or
in between. The mathematical formulation of ωt is as:
ωt = ‖I′(xs,pt −xe,pt )‖2, (2)
where xs,pt = [ x
s,p
t y
s,p
t θ
s,p
t v
s,p
t ]
T denotes the sur-
rounding vehicle’s predicted driving state at time step t
and xe,pt is the ego vehicle’s predicted driving state made
by the surrounding vehicle defined similarly with xs,pt . The
definition of I′ is as
I′ =
[
1
as
0 0 0
0 1bs 0 0
]
,
where as, bs are semi-major axis and semi-minor axis of
the ellipse representing the surrounding vehicle respectively.
The definition (2) shows that ω is a scalar and the smaller it
is, the less conservative (more aggressive) the ego vehicle
appears to the surrounding vehicle. For instance, in the
extreme scenario where the distance dt is almost 0 and
ω equals to 0 which means the ego vehicle totally does
not care about the surrounding vehicle so that its behavior
becomes significantly influential to the surrounding vehicle.
An opposite case happens when dt is approaching infinity
and ω also goes to infinity, the ego vehicle then cannot bring
any influence to the surrounding vehicle and the surrounding
vehicle thus has no incentive to consider what the ego
vehicle will do in the future. Of course, these scenarios are
impossible in the practical driving system. However, they
effectively demonstrate the essence of ωt .
In summary, in the Bayesian persuasive driving process,
the ego vehicle aims at finding an optimal signal determined
by its driving behavior. The general Bayesian persuasion
optimization (1) can be reformulated as
min
pi(xet ),uet
∫
xet pi(x
e
t )minxst
∫
ωt µ(ωt |xet )c(ωt ,xst ,xet ,uet ) (3)
for the interactive driving scenario with the expectation term
expanded, where
uet = [ aet δ et ]
T
denotes the ego vehicle’s control input at time instant t
including acceleration aet and steering angle δ et . In order
to avoid shortsighted non-optimal behavior, a receding time
horizon is introduced:
min
pi(xet|t0 ),u
e
t|t0
t0+N
∑
t=t0
∫
xet|t0
pi(xet|t0)×
min
xst|t0
∫
ωt|t0
µ(ωt|t0 |xet|t0)c(ωt|t0 ,xst|t0 ,xet|t0 ,uet|t0),(4)
where N is the optimization horizon length, t0 is the current
time instant, (•)t|t0 denotes prediction of variable for t made
at t0.
B. Gaussian assumption
The optimization (3) is intractable since the decision vari-
able is a probability distribution in continuous space. In order
to make (3) solvable, the Gaussian assumption is made so
that each probability distribution can be described by a mean
and a variance in an exponential form. Therefore, the deci-
sion variable of (3) is reduced from a complicated probability
distribution to a vector-valued mean and a covairance matrix.
Moreover, the exponential form of Gaussian distribution also
facilitates the next integral approximation step. With the
Gaussian assumption, the probability distributions pi and µ
in the original problem (4) can be explicitly written as
pi : xet|t0 ∼N (xˆet|t0 ,Σxet|t0 ),
µ : ωt|t0 |xet|t0 ∼N (ωˆt|t0 |xet|t0 ,Σωt |xet|t0 ), (5)
where x ∼ N (xˆ,Σ) means that random variable x has the
Gaussian distribution with mean of xˆ and covariance of Σ.
Then the Bayesian persuasion game can be reorganized
as:
min
xˆet|t0 ,u
e
t|t0
t0+N
∑
t=t0
∫
xet|t0
Gxet|t0
(xˆet|t0 ,Σxet|t0
)×
min
xst|t0
∫
ωt|t0
[
Gωt|t0 (ωˆt|t0 |x
e
t|t0 ,Σωt|t0 |xet|t0
)×
c(ωt|t0 ,x
s
t|t0 ,x
e
t|t0 ,u
e
t|t0)
]
(6)
where the expectations of ego vehicle driving states xˆet|t0(t =
t0, · · · , t0 +N) and control inputs uet|t0(t = t0, · · · , t0 +N) are
new decision variables,
Gx(xˆ,Σ) =
exp(− 12 (x− xˆ)TΣ−1(x− xˆ))√
(2pi)k|Σ| ,
denotes the density function of Gaussian distribution
N (xˆ,Σ) and k is the dimension of x. ωˆt|t0 |xet|t0 follows the
same definition of ω as in (2):
ωˆt|t0 |xet|t0 = ‖I′(x
s,p
t −xet|t0)‖2, (7)
where the ego vehicle’s driving state prediction xe,pt is
replaced by xet|t0 . According to the definition (7), the sur-
rounding vehicle’s expected impression of the ego vehicle
given his driving behavior is dependent on how the ego
vehicle will influence its original driving plan.
C. Cost function
The cost function c in (6) is defined in exponential form
as
c(ωt|t0 ,x
s
t|t0 ,x
e
t|t0 ,u
e
t|t0) = exp
(
(1+ωt|t0)‖xst|t0 −x
s,p
t|t0‖
2
W1
+‖xet|t0 −xeg‖2W2 +‖∆u
e,T
t|t0 ‖W3
−‖xst|t0 −xet|t0‖2W4
)
, (8)
where xeg denotes the ego vehicle’s desired goal state, ∆uet|t0 =
uet|t0 −uet−1|t0 represents the change of ego vehicle’s control
input and W1, W2, W3 and W4 are positive definite penalty
matrices. It is required that W1−W4 0 in order to guarantee
the existence of a minimum for the cost function c with
regard to xst|t0 . In the rest of the paer, W1 and W4 are set to
be equal to w1I and w4I respectively, where I denotes the
identity matrix, w1 and w4 are scalars.
The first term in the cost function (8) represents the
surrounding vehicle’s preference of tracking his original
driving plan, the second and third terms are driving the
ego vehicle to his goal and penalizing the input change
in order to achieve comfortable driving experience and the
last term represents the surrounding vehicle’s aversion of
risk, i.e., the preference to keep a certain distance from
the ego vehicle. According to the definition (8), when the
perceived conservativeness of the ego vehicle ωt|t0 is lower,
the surrounding vehicle will be inclined to focus more on
the safety instead of sticking to his original plan. Otherwise,
when ωt|t0 is higher, meaning that the surrounding vehicle is
more likely to treat the ego vehicle as a conservative agent,
it will be intuitive for him to pursue a more selfish behavior.
The cost function c in (8) shows that the surrounding
vehicle’s action is dependent on two factors, i.e., the world
state of the Bayesian game ωt|t0 and the penalty matrix W1.
The penalty matrix W1 represents the interacting vehicle’s
driving characteristics, which can only be recognized but not
controlled.
Note that although the cost function (8) is intended for
two vehicle interaction scenario, the framework can be
extended to multiple vehicle interaction case by including
more surrounding vehicles in the cost function definition.
D. Constraints
In the interactive driving application, besides the Bayesian
cost function in (6), certain constraints need to be handled in-
cluding model dynamics, control input saturation and safety
constraint.
1) Vehicle dynamics: In this paper, the bicycle model [7]
is adopted to describe the vehicle dynamics as follows:
xet+1|t0=x
e
t|t0+Tsv
e
t|t0 cos
(
θ et|t0+ tan
−1(
Lr
L
tanδ et|t0)
)
yet+1|t0=y
e
t|t0+Tsv
e
t|t0 sin
(
θ et|t0+ tan
−1(
Lr
L
tanδ et|t0)
)
θ et+1|t0=θ
e
t|t0+Tsv
e
t|t0
tanδ et
L
cos
(
tan−1(
Lr
L
tanδ et|t0)
)
vet+1|t0=v
e
t|t0+Tsa
e
t|t0 , (9)
where Ts is the sampling time, t is the time index, Lr, L f and
L=Lr+L f denote the dimension parameters of the vehicle
which are the vehicle’s rear, front and full length respectively.
The model equations (9) can be summarized as
xet+1|t0 = f (x
e
t|t0 ,u
e
t|t0). (10)
2) Safety constraint: Another critical constraint for au-
tonomous driving is the guarantee of safety. For the static
obstacles including parking vehicles and lane boundaries, the
following constraint is defined:
ymin ≤ ye,it|t0 ≤ ymax, i ∈ {1,2,3,4}, (11)
where ye,it|t0 denotes the y coordinate of the vehicle’s i-th
corner at time step t, ymin and ymax represent the lateral
position’s lower and upper limit respectively. With regard
to the moving surrounding vehicle obstacles, the safety
constraint is defined as:
‖I′(xs,pt −xet|t0)‖2 ≥ 1, (12)
where the surrounding vehicle is described by the same
ellipse as in (2). In addition, another constraint is imposed
on the vehicle speed which is
vmin ≤ vet|t0 ≤ vmax, (13)
where vmin and vmax are minimum and maximum speed
respectively.
3) Saturation constraint: In addition to the vehicle mod-
eling and safety constraint, the system also needs to be
consistent with the physical control saturation constraint
described by
ue ≤ uet|t0 ≤ ue, (14)
where ue, ue represent the lower and upper control saturation
bound respectively.
E. Integral calculation
Currently, the Bayesian persuasion is mainly applied in the
economy community. The main factor limiting its popularity
in other areas is that calculation of expectation for continuous
distribution requires computation of integrals as illustrated by
(6). Although Gaussian assumption grants the reduction of
decision variable from a distribution to a vector, calculation
of integrals is still challenging, especially for the autonomous
driving problem with high dimension involved. In this
subsection, through introducing several approximations, the
original cost fucntion (4) is reformulated into a tractable
form. By an abuse of notation, the subscript t|t0 is replaced
by t in this subsection.
First consider the integral with regard to ωt :∫
ωt
Gωt (ωˆt |xet ,Σωt |xet )c(ωt ,xst ,xet ,uet ). (15)
As ωt is a scalar variable, we can directly calculate the result
of (15) as ∫
ωt
Gωt (ωˆt |xet ,Σωt |xet )c(ωt ,xst ,xet ,uet )
= εexp
(
1
2
Σωt |xet [(x
s
t −xs,pt )TW1(xst −xs,pt )]2
)
×
c(ωˆt |xet ,xst ,xet ,uet ), (16)
where
ε =Ψ
 ωˆt |xet +Σωt |xet (xst −xs,pt )TW1(xst −xs,pt )
Σ
1
2
ωt |xet
 ,
Ψ(x) =
1
2
(1+ er f (x/
√
2))
is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian
distribution and er f (•) is the error function. According to the
safety constraint (12), ωˆt |xet ≥ 1 always holds. Hence when
the variance Σωt |xet is chosen to be less than 0.2, we have
1≥ ε ≥Ψ(
√
5) =
1
2
(1+ er f (
√
2.5)) = 0.9873, (17)
resulting in ε ≈ 1 due to er f (•)’s S-shape property.
Then, the solution to the sub-problem
min
xst
∫
ωt
Gωt (ωˆt |xet ,Σωt |xet )c(ωt ,xst ,xet ,uet )
can be obtained as
xs∗t ≈
(
(1+Σωt |xet γt + ωˆ|xet )W1−W4
)−1 ∗(
(1+Σωt |xet γt + ωˆ|xet )W1x
s,p
t −W4xet
)
(18)
via setting the derivative equal to zero, where
γt = (xst−1−xs,pt−1)TW1(xst−1−xs,pt−1),
xs,pt−1 is the previous prediction and x
s
t−1 denotes the surround-
ing vehicle’s previous state.
Substituting (18) into (16) obtains
min
xst
∫
ωt
Gωt (ωˆt |xet ,Σωt |xet )c(ωt ,xst ,xet )
≈ exp{(xet −xeg)TW2(xet −xeg)+ue,Tt W3uet + k1ωˆt |xet + k2
+
k3
[w1ωˆt |xet +((1+Σωt |xet γt)w1−w4)]
+
k4
[w1ωˆt |xet +((1+Σωt |xet γt)w1−w4)]2
}, (19)
where k1, k2, k3 and k4 are constant scalars dependent on w1,
w4, Σωt |xet and γt . Furthermore, it can be guaranteed that k3 is
always negative and k4 is always positive so that there exists
a upper bound k for the last two terms in (19) as ωˆt |xet ≥ 0.
Thus the original optimization (6) is changed to
min
xˆet ,uet
∫
xet
Gxet (xˆ
e
t ,Σxet )exp{(xet −xeg)TW2(xet −xeg)
+ue,Tt W3uet + k1ωˆt |xet }, (20)
where the constant terms k2 and k are omitted.
The integral term in (20) can be compactly written as∫
xet
exp(C(xet )),
where C(xet ) is in quadratic form. Since the variable xet is
a vector, a mathematical approximation technique based on
Lapace’s method is utilized to eliminate the high-dimensional
integral [8]. Via taking second order Taylor seires expansion
around xe∗t :=argminxet C(x
e
t ) where ∇C(xe∗t ) equals to 0, the
following equation can be obtained:
C(xet ) ≈ C(xe∗t )+∇C(xe∗t )T (xet −xe∗t )
+
1
2
(xet −xe∗t )T∇2C(xe∗t )(xet −xe∗t )
= C(xe∗t )+
1
2
(xet −xe∗t )T∇2C(xe∗t )(xet −xe∗t ).(21)
Then the integral term
∫
xet exp(C(x
e
t )) can be approximated
as ∫
xet
exp(C(xet )) ≈ keexp(C(xe∗t )), (22)
where ke is a constant determined by the Hessian ∇2C(xe∗t ).
Then the cost function in (20) can be reformulated as
min
xˆet ,uet
Jt =−12 (x
e∗
t − xˆet )TΣ−1xet (x
e∗
t − xˆet )+ue,Tt W3uet
+(xe∗t −xeg)TW2(xe∗t −xeg)+ k1ωˆt |xe∗t . (23)
Note that xe∗t in (23) is a linear combination of xˆet , xeg and
xs,pt , thus the cost function in (23) is a quadratic function
with regard to xˆet .
Remark 1: Note that the accurate distribution of ωt |xet
is supposed to be truncated Gaussian instead of standard
Gaussian as ωt is always positive due to defintion in (2).
The strict formula of ωt |xet ’s density function is
f (ω|xet ) =
Gωt (ωˆt |xet ,Σωt )
Σ
1
2
ωt |xet
1−Ψ
− ωˆt |xet
Σ
1
2
ωt |xet
 . (24)
According to the safety consrtaint (12) and utilizing the same
approximation as for ε in (17), the denominator of (24) can
be treated as a constant and hence the usage of Gaussian
distribution in (6) is validated.
F. Bayesian persuasive optimization
With the integral calculation result from the previous sub-
section, the solvable form of the original Bayesian persuasive
driving optimization (4) can be summarized as
min
xˆet|t0 ,u
e
t|t0
∑t0+N−1t=t0 Jt (25)
s.t. xˆet+1|t0 = f (xˆ
e
t|t0 ,u
e
t|t0),
‖I′(xˆet|t0 −x
s,p
t )‖2 ≥ 1,
ue ≤ uet|t0 ≤ u
e,
xˆet0|t0 = x
e
t0 ,vmin ≤ vˆet|t0 ≤ vmax,
ymin ≤ yˆe,it|t0 ≤ ymax, i ∈ {1,2,3,4},
t = t0, · · · , t0+N−1, (26)
where xet0 is the ego vehicle’s current driving state.
Remark 2: After obtaining the solution to the optimization
(25) and observing the surrounding vehicle’s behavior, more
information about the interacting vehicle’s characteristics
will be revealed so that the covariance and penalty matrices
in the cost function should be updated accordingly. With
regard to Σxet , it is updated based on the surrounding vehicle’s
confident level of the ego vehicle’s behavior, which can be
approximated by
α =
t0+N−1
∑
t=t0
wαt ‖xet|t0 −xet|t0−1‖2, (27)
where wαt ’s are weighting factors satisfying ∑t wαt = 1.
According to the definition, smaller α indicates that the
ego vehicle’s behavior is more consistent with its previ-
ous driving plan and thus the surrounding vehicle will be
more confident about the information he extract from the
ego vehicle’s behavior. Therefore, the covariance matrix of
probability distribution Σxrt should be proportional to α .
As shown in the cost function (8), the penalty matrix W1
which reflects the surrounding vehicle’s driving character-
istics is another influential factor of the algorithm. Similar
with the update strategy for Σxet , the update of W1 is based
on the surrounding vehicle’s confidence in his own driving
plan, which can be inferred from the following parameter:
β =
t0+N−1
∑
t=t0
wβt ‖xs,pt|t0 −x
s,p
t|t0−1‖2, (28)
where wβt ’s are weighting factors for β satisfying ∑t w
β
t = 1.
Intuitively, a smaller β represents a smaller change of the
surrounding vehicle’s driving plan, reflecting his more self-
centric driving characteristics resulting in a larger W1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the proposed algorithm’s performance is
demonstrated by simulations implemented for several driving
scenarios including lane changing, lane keeping and intersec-
tion crossing. In the simulation, the surrounding vehicles are
assumed to follow a model predictive control (MPC) strat-
egy with different safety weights reflecting various driving
characteristics, i.e., more cautious/conservative drivers are
associated with higher safety weights and more aggressive
drivers are represented by lower safety weights. Another
assumption is about perfect prediction, which means that the
ego vehicle knows exactly what the surrounding vehicle’s
driving plan is. Although this is a very strong assumption,
the algorithm is still necessary as its point is to persuade the
surrounding vehicle to change its original plan instead of just
identifying it.
A. Simulation setting
The simulation environment utililzed in this paper is a
1/10 scaled version of the real world and all the vehicles are
assumed to be of the same size. The dimension parameters
are shown in Table I, where WV and WL are width of the
vehicle and the lane respectively. The other optimization
configurations are shown in Table II, where ueδ , u
e
δ are lower
and upper bound for steering angle and uea, u
e
a are lower and
upper bound for acceleration respectively.
TABLE I: Dimension parameters
L f Lr WV WL
0.21(m) 0.19(m) 0.19(m) 0.37(m)
TABLE II: Optimization configurations
Ts N uea u
e
δ
0.1(s) 30 -1(m/s2) −pi/3(rad)
uea u
e
δ ymin ymax
1(m/s2) pi/3(rad) 0(m) 0.74(m)
vmin vmax as bs
0(m/s) 1.5(m/s) 0.75(m) 0.35(m)
B. Lane changing scenario
First consider the scenario where the ego vehicle attempts
to change to the neighboring lane with two surrounding
vehicles running in it. The front surrounding vehicle is
assumed to be always aggressive (safety weight equals to
zero) so that it will never yield the ego vehicle and the
rear vehicle’s safety weight is adjusted to represent different
kinds of driver, where large safety weight means nice driver
and small or zero safety weight is utilized for iron nerved
aggressive driver. The interacting case with “nice” driver is
shown in Fig. 1, where the ego vehicle is represented by
the yellow rectangle, the front and rear vehicle are plotted
as blue and green rectangle respectively. The solid red line
represents the ego vehicle’s driving trajectory. In this case,
the nice driver decided to decelerate and yield the ego
vehicle. The ego vehicle thus took the chance and finished
the lane changing task smoothly.
Figure 2 shows another case with “tough” driver who
chooses to accelerate and ignore the ego vehicle’s lane
changing need. In this case, as the rear vehicle refused
to yield, the ego vehicle waited until the rear surrounding
vehicle passed and completed lane changing later.
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Fig. 1: Lane changing scenario with “nice” surrounding
vehicle
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Fig. 2: Lane changing scenario with “tough” surrounding
vehicle
C. Lane keeping scenario
In the lane keeping scenario, the ego vehicle needs to
make decision between to yield or not to yield when the
surrounding vehicle seeks to merge in. The simulation results
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate the ego vehicle’s intelligent
driving behavior when interacting with nice and tough driver
respectively. In the case of a nice driver, the ego vehicle
decides to ignore its merging request and accelerate to show
its intention as shown in Fig. 3. On the other hand, when
interacting with a more aggressive driver, the ego vehicle
expresses its intention of yielding by decelerating as shown
in Fig. 4. The speed profile for these two driving situations
are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 respectively.
D. Intersection crossing scenario
Another common driving scenario is intersection cross-
ing, where both the vehicles need to reason about who is
supposed to pass first. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 demonstrate the
algorithm’s performace when interacting with different kinds
of driver. In the figures, the yellow rectangle represent the
ego vehicle and the blue rectangle is the surrounding vehicle.
It is shown in Fig. 7 (Fig. 8) that the ego vehicle decides to
pass first (second) when meeting a nice (tough) driver, which
is consistent with human driving behavior. The vehicles’
speed profiles are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, which further
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Fig. 3: Lane keeping scenario with “nice” surrounding vehi-
cle
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Fig. 4: Lane keeping scenario with “tough” surrounding
vehicle
illustrate the ego vehicle’s intention. In the case of nice
surrounding vehicle, the ego vehicle keeps accelerating and
cross the intersection first. When interacting with a tough
surrounding vehicle, the ego vehicle first inches a little and
then stops, waiting for the other vehicle to pass.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an optimization-based Bayesian persuasive
driving algorithm was proposed. In the persuasion game, the
ego vehicle serves as the information sender who attempts to
manipulate the surrounding vehicle’s (information receiver)
posterior belief of the world state in order to achieve a lower
cost for both players via providing information about its
driving intention. The world state of the Bayesian game was
defined to be the surrounding vehicle’s impression about the
ego vehicle. In the surrounding vehicle’s point of view, both
the signaling and the belief of the world state are formulated
as Gaussian distributions. An integral approximation was
applied to reformulate the optimization into a tractable form.
As shown by simulation results in several driving scenarios,
the ego vehicle is capable of interacting with various types
of surrounding vehicles intelligently due to the persuasion
signaling strategy.
In our future work, the surrounding vehicle’s intention
prediction will be studied and incorporated with the proposed
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
time [s]
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
sp
ee
d [m
/s]
self vehicle speed
human driver vehicle speed
Fig. 5: Lane keeping speed profile (“nice” surrounding
vehicle case)
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Fig. 6: Lane keeping speed profile (“tough” surrounding
vehicle case)
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Fig. 7: Intersection scenario with “nice” surrounding vehicle
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Fig. 8: Intersection scenario with “tough” surrounding vehi-
cle
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Fig. 9: Intersection crossing speed profile (“nice” surround-
ing vehicle case)
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Fig. 10: Intersection crossing speed profile (“tough” sur-
rounding vehicle case)
Bayesian persuasive algorithm. In addition, a high level
decision making controller will also be explored to set
appropriate desired goal state for the ego vehicle.
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